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Comments
THE CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING DEATH IN VITAL
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS-A MEDICO-LEGAL DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 1972, the jury in Tucker's Administrator v. Lower' returned
a verdict in favor of a defendant heart transplant surgeon in a wrongful
death action brought by the donor's brother. This was the nation's first
court decision involving a heart transplant. The judge gave an instruction,
unprecedented in medico-legal history, that allowed the jury to use cessa-
tion of brain function as a possible definition of death. Specifically, the
instruction stated three possible criteria for death of the donor: (1) Total
lack of circulation; (2) cessation of other vital functions, such as respira-
tion and pulse; and (3) complete, irreversible loss of brain function. The
instruction also allowed the jury to consider whether any of these functions
were spontaneous or were artificially maintained.2 The jury found that
the surgeon had not caused the donor's death by removing him from a
respirator after his brain had ceased to function. Considering the criteria
of death furnished the jury by the court's instruction, it is apparent from
their decision that the jury was guided by the irreversible loss of brain
function portion of the instruction.
Recent medical advances in the field of vital organ transplantations8
have raised complex legal, medical, and ethical questions concerning the
concept of death. When is a donor actually dead so that his organs can
be removed and transplanted into a living patient? Traditionally, death
has been associated with the cessation of heartbeat and respiration. The
classical medical and legal definitions of death are based on this idea. How-
1. No. 2831 (Ct. Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972). A complete ac-
count of the case is presented in Mosher, When Does Life End?, The National Ob-
server, June 3, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
2. The instruction given by the judge in Tucker reads as follows:
The court instructs the jury that you shall determine the time of death
in this case by using the following definition of the nature of death.
Death is a cessation of life. It is the ceasing to exist. Under the law, death
is not continuing but occurs at a precise time and that time must be estab-
lished according to the facts of each specific case.
In determining the time of death, as aforesaid, under the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case, you may consider the following elements, none
of which should necessarily be considered controlling, although you may
feel under the evidence that one or more of these conditions are con-
trolling: the time of the total stoppage of the circulation of the blood;
the time of the total cessation of the other -vital functions consequent there-
to, such as respiration and pulsation; the time of complete and irreversible
loss of all function of the brain; and, whether or not the aforesaid func-
tions were spontaneous or were being maintained artificially or mechan-
ically.
3. A vital organ transplantation is one that requires a dead donor. Hence,
transplants of heart, liver, or lungs are vital organ transplantations.
(220) 1
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ever, the advancement of new methods to support cardiac and respiratory
functions artificially has caused the medical profession to reevaluate the
traditional criteria of death. As a result, the concept of brain death is
gaining support in the medical profession.
This comment discusses the issue of defining when a person is dead in
light of the new discoveries concerning the functioning of man's brain.
The medical community is presently in a state of flux over the criteria
that should be employed to determine brain death, and the law has gen-
erally resisted any change in the present legal definition of death. The
article analyzes the medical profession's problems in changing to a brain
death definition and the arguments over what criteria should be adopted
to facilitate the change. The present legal definition of death is also
examined, along with the attendant legal problems that may develop if law
and medicine apply different criteria to determine death.
Although there are many legal problems in the area of vital organ
transplantation other than the determination of when the donor is dead,
this comment deals exclusively with the issue of the definition of death.
It does not discuss the problems of consent,4 incompetent donors,5 or the
ethical considerations surrounding the transplantation of vital organs.6
II. MEDICAL DEFINrrIONS oF DEATH-PRESENT AN FUTURE
Current definitions of death found in various medical dictionaries and
cyclopedias revolve around one central theme: the cessation of all vital
functions of the human body.7 In formulating the criteria for determining
death, these traditional medical definitions do not isolate the function of
any one organ; rather, they emphasize the total stoppage of all vital bodily
functions. The medical profession has characterized this total stoppage of
vital functions more concretely as the combined cessation of heartbeat and
4. For artides dealing with this problem, see Curran, A Problem of Consent:
Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 84 N.Y.U.L. REv. 891 (1959); Fletcher, Human
Experimentation: Ethics in the Consent Situation, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
620 (1967); Jaffe, Law as a System of Control, 98 DAEDAJs-J. AMa. AcAD. ARTs &c
Sci. 423 (1969); Samansky, Tissue and Organ Transplants in Human Beings, 19
BROOKLYN BAmUsm 172 (1968); Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progress,
32 L W & CONTEMP. PROB. 563 (1967); Ritts, Plante, Ratnoff, Smith, J., Sharpe,
Hargest & Smith, D., A Symposium: Some Legal Problems in Medical Treatment
and Research, 36 FomHast L. R v. 631 (1968); Comment, Jurisdiction, Incom-
petant Donor's Consent to a Kidney Transplant, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 157 (1970);
Comment, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970 Wis. L. REv.
879 (1970).
5. For articles dealing with this problem, see Note, Transplantation-Incom-
petent Donors, 58 CALiF. L. REv. 754 (1970); Dyer, Kidney Transplant-Mentally
Incompetent Donor, 35 Mo. L. REv. 538 (1970).
6. For articles discussing this point, see Page, The Ethics of Heart Trans-
plantation, 207 A.M.A.J. 109 (1969); Perper, Ethical, Religious, and Legal Con-
siderations to Transplantation of Human Organs, 15 J. FOR. ScI. 1 (1970); Shelley,
Ethical Guidelines for Organ Transplantation, 205 A.M.A.J. 341 (1968).
7. For a brief survey of the various medical definitions of death, see Halley &
Harvey, On an Interdisciplinary Solution to the Legal-Medical Definitional Dilem-
ma in Death, 2 IND. LEGAL F. 219 (1969); Hannah, The Signs of Death: Historical
Review, 28 N.C. MED. J. 457 (1967).
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respiration.8 For example, Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary defines
death as "[t]he apparent extinction of life, as evidenced by absence of heart-
beat and respiration." 9 Blackiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary defines
death as "[t]he cessation of life, beyond the possibility of resuscitation."10
These classical medical definitions of death give no special significance to
the vital function of the brain. This is probably the result of two factors:
First, the medical profession's desire to place the definition of death on an
integrated basis, stressing the idea of total stoppage of bodily functions;
and, second, the formulation of these definitions during a time when medi-
cal science knew little about the processes of the human brain and con-
sidered the heart to be the center of the body's functions."1 When the heart
stopped beating, respiration would cease; and the mysterious organ called
the brain would stop functioning soon thereafter. Since the brain ceased to
function at some time after the heart stopped beating, there seemed to be
no necessity to determine the precise time at which brain activity ceased.
However, the development of electrical shock treatment, cardiac pace-
makers, and resuscitators disturbed the above sequence of events. For ex-
ample, a patient could have a heart attack, suffer complete cardiac arrest,
and yet be resuscitated. Furthermore, it became possible to maintain a
patient's respiratory activity on machines, though he had no hope of re-
covery due to severe brain damage. Dr. Carl Wasmuth 12 best described
these advances when he wrote:
With the technological advances in medicine, it is possible to main-
tain by mechanical means both the heartbeat and the respiration.
A cardiac pacemaker, with a self-contained power source, can be
implanted under the skin of the trunk of the body and the wires
connected to the heart muscle. By rhythmic discharge of the electri-
cal current of this pacemaker, the heart is stimulated to contract,
thus maintaining circulation of the blood. In certain individuals,
"life" as classically defined is extended by artificial means. Like-
wise, the significant advances in the ventilatory equipment now
permit physicians, particularly in the intensive care units of hos-
pitals, to maintain respiratory excursions in patients who have suf-
fered respiratory arrest. Thus, in many instances death is thwarted
by the simple expedience of supporting by mechanical means the
two vital processes described in the above definition [the present
medical definitions], the absence of which is defined as death.18
8. Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 273(1968); Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 O.S.U.L.J. 32 (1969).
9. Halley &c Harvey, supra note 7, at 230, citing DoRauesD'S ILLUsTATED MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 387 (29th ed. 1965).
10. BLAclisToN's Nxw GourD MEricAL DICrTONARY 274 (1st ed. 1951).
11. See Beecher, Scarce Resources and Medical Advancements, 98 DAEDALuS-
J. Ams. AcAD. ARTs & Sci. 291 (1969); Hannah, supra note 7, at 460; Wasmuth, supra
note 8, at 46.
12. Dr. Wasmuth is a Senior Consultant, Dep't of Anesthesiology, Cleveland
Clinic Hospital, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law.
13. Wasmuth, The Medical, Legal and Ethical Considerations of Human
Organ Transplantations, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 636, 648-49 (1970). For discus-
sions of the effect of these advancements, see Biorck, When is Death?, 1968 Wis. L.
[Vol. 38
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Study of the human brain has revealed that the nerve cells of the
cerebral cortex 14 can survive anoxia' 5 for no more than 3 to 6 minutes,
after which the brain can no longer function in its capacity of reasoning
and thinking.16 The mid-brain and brain stem, which control vital bodily
functions, including spontaneous heartbeat, can withstand a lack of
oxygen supply for only 15 minutes. Thus, when a patient's heart stops, his
brain will be irreversibly damaged, unless its oxygen supply is quicldy
restored. If all parts of the brain cease to function, the heart can no longer
beat spontaneously, since the brain controls this function.' 7
Yet, cardiac resuscitation by artificial means is still possible at this
point, and the patient's heartbeat and respiration may be maintained by
machines, though his brain is completely nonfunctional. This paradoxical
situation has indicated to the medical profession that the present criteria
for determining death is unsatisfactory, and has prompted a majority of
physicians to urge the adoption of some type of brain death definition.' 8
Thus, physicians assert that when the brain activity ceases and spontaneous
respiration and heartbeat cease, the individual is dead.' 9
The advent of cardiac transplantation in the early 1960's provided
the real impetus toward a change in the traditional definitions of death.
REv. 484, 493; Castel, Some Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation in
Canada, 46 CAN. B. Rv. 345, 351 (1968); Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal
Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation, 14 CImv.-MAP L. REv. 442 (1965); Com-
ment, California's Response to the Problems of Procuring Human Remains for
Transplantation, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 671, 689 (1969); Comment, The Need for a
Redefinition of Death, 45 Cm.-K.ENT L. REv. 202 (1968); Note, Human Organ
Transplantation: Some Medico-Legal Pitfalls for Transplant Surgeons, 23 U. FLA.
L. REv. 134, 142 (1970).
14. The cerebral cortex is the main part of the brain, situated in the upper
part of the cranium, and consisting of two equal parts known as hemispheres. The
main function of the cerebral cortex is to control voluntary and conscious activity.
See ScmunT's A-rroPNay's DicroNARY OF MEDICINE, C-49 (1st ed. 1972).
15. Anoxia is "[t]he condition in which the oxygen content of the cells and
tissues of the body is below normal." ScHmmT's ATroRNEY's DICrONARY OF MEDICINE,
A-170 (1st ed. 1972).
16. Biorck, supra note 13, at 493; Ford, Human Organ Transplantation: Legal
Aspects, 15 CATH. LAw. 136, 140 (1969); Wasmuth, supra note 8, at 36; Comment,
Medico-Legal Problems with the Question of Death, 5 CALi. W.L. REv. 110, 116-17
(1968).
17. For a discussion of the effect on other bodily functions of cessation of
brain activity, see, Ad Hoc Committee at Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 A.MA.J. 337
(1968).
18. See Appel, Ethical and Legal Questions Posed by Recent Advances in
Medicine, 205 A.M.A.J. 513 (1968); Ayd, When is a Person Dead?, 4 LAwYEas'
MED. J. 81 (1968); Beecher, supra note 11, at 291; Cooley, Minutes of the Cape
Town Meeting, 9 MED. WoaI- Naws 21 (Aug. 9, 1968); Randall &c Randall, The
Developing Field of Human Transplantation, 5 GONZAGA L. Rav. 20 (1969);
Richards, Medical-Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 77
(1969); Sadler & Sadler, Transplantation and the Law: The Need for Organized
Sensitivity, 57 GEo. L.J. 5 (1968); Editorial, When is a Patient Dead?, 204 A.M.A.J.
1000 (1968); Note, Death with Dignity: A Recommendation for Statutory Change,
22 U. FLA. L. REv. 368 (1970).
19. See Moore, infra note 23, at 386; Comment, supra note 16, at 123; Note,
Law and Life: Organ Transplants, 20 S. CAR. L. REv. 765 (1968).
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The conditions essential for vital organ transplantation, plus the shortage
of such organs as the heart, liver, and lungs available for transplantation,
brought into focus the inadequacy of the existing medical definitions of
death.
The dilemma faced by the transplant surgeon becomes apparent from
an examination of the requirements of a successful vital organ transplant.
Simply stated, a vital organ transplant requires a live organ in a dead donor.
Time is of the essence in maintaining the vitality of the organ being trans-
planted. 20 It is estimated that the surgeon has only 10 minutes to remove
a heart, liver, or lung from the donor and transplant it into the donee.21
The stoppage of heartbeat and respiration criteria in the present classical
definition of death would require the cessation of circulation in the donor
before the surgeon could remove the organ. At this stage, the vital organ
would have already begun to deteriorate, thus significantly reducing the
probability of a successful transplant.22 In addition, a transplant surgeon
functioning under the classical criteria of death was often forced to
watch a patient die while a potential donor, with no hope of regaining con-
sciousness, was maintained by artificial means until further complications
developed and his heart and respiration finally ceased.28 In contrast, a
transplant surgeon applying a brain death definition could remove an
organ even though the donor's circulation was still being maintained arti-
ficially. This could greatly increase the probability that a transplant opera-
tion would be successful.
III. Tim PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR DETERIINING BRAIN DEATH
Although a majority in the medical profession agree that a definition
of death based on irreversible loss of brain function must be adopted,
there is extensive argument over what should be the specific criteria for
determining brain death. A number of criteria for determining brain death
have been proposed. These proposed criteria have certain common factors,
including the absence of spontaneous respiration and muscular move-
ment, absence of all reflexes, and an isoelectric (flat) electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) reading.24 Despite their similarities, real differences exist
among these proposed definitions of brain death. Before any generally
accepted criteria can emerge, the medical profession must resolve these
20. Stickel, Organ Transplantation in Medical and Legal Perspectives, 32
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 597 (1967).
21. Wasmuth, supra note 8, at 36.
22. Corday, Death in Human Transplantation, 55 A.M.A.J. 629 (1969).
23. See Moore, Medical Responsibility for the Prolongation of L:fe, 206
A.M.A.J. 384 (1968); McCleave, Collins, Lewis, Provonsha &c Moore, Symposium:
'When Do You Pull the Plug?', 205 A.M.A.J. 29 (1968).
24. An EEG reading is obtained by attaching electrodes to the patient's head
and examining the brain wave produced on a monitor. For articles discussing the
operation of the electroencephalogram, see Green, What Constitutes Legal Death?,
61 J. IND. ST. MED. Ass'N 1120, 1122 (1968); Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190
A.M.A.J. 112 (1964); Editorial, supra note 18, at 1000; Note, supra note 13, at 147.
Isoelectric is defined as "[having the same or an equal electric potential (as
another point of reference); having the same voltage and the same polarity." This
situation produces a flat line across the electroencephalogram. SCHmIDT'S ATroRNEY's
DICrIONARY OF MEDICINE 487 (1st ed. 1972).
[Vol. 38
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differences. This section examines four proposed sets of criteria for de-
termining brain death, as well as some additional factors advanced by
others in the medical field.25
In 1968, an Ad Hoc Committee on Human Tissue Transplantation
meeting at Duquesne University Law School proposed the following defi-
nition of brain death:
I. Documentation of Death.
A. Lack of responsiveness to external and internal environ-
ment.
B. Absence of spontaneous breathing movements for three
minutes ....
C. No muscular movements ....
D. Reflexes and Responses
1. Pupils fixed and dilated ....
2. Corneal reflexes absent.3. Supraorbital and other pressure response absent ....
4. Absence of snouting and sucking responses.
5. No reflex response to upper airway stimulation.
6. No reflex response to lower airway stimulation.
7. No ocular response to ice water stimulation of inner
ear.
8. No deep tendon reflexes.
9. No superficial reflexes.
10. No plantar responses.
E. Falling arterial pressure without support by drugs or other
means.
F. Isoelectric electroencephalogram .... Multiple recordings
totalling at least thirty .... minutes ....
II. Certification of Death
A. Criteria A through F should be present for at least two
hours before death is certified.
B. Death should be certified and recorded .... by two phy-
sicians other than the physicians of a potential organ re-
cipient.2 6
It is significant that the Pittsburgh Committee's definition requires an
isoelectric EEG reading for 30 minutes. Also significant is the requirement
that the patient be reexamined 2 hours after the initial tests to determine
if the factors for documenting brain death are still present.
Mr. S. D. Rosoff, a New York attorney, and Dr. R. S. Schwab2 7 de-
veloped the following criteria for diagnosing irreversible coma:28
(1) no reflexes, spontaneous breathing, or muscle activity;
25. Further sets of criteria not discussed in this section can be found in Gor-
don, The Biological Definition of Death, 15 J. FOR. MED. 5 (1968); Halley &c
Harvey, supra note 7, at 225; McCutcheon, A Neurologist Looks at Death, 204
A.M.A.J. 1197 (1968); Randall & Randall, supra note 18, at 35-36; Wasmuth, supra
note 13, at 651; Comment, Liability and the Heart Transplant, 6 Hous. L. R.v.
85, 99 (1968).
26. Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Trans-
plantation, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 488, 493-94 (1969).
27. Dr. Schwab is presently Director of the Massachusetts General Hospital
Brain Wave Laboratory.
28. The term "irreversible coma" is used throughout the article as being
synonomous with brain death.
1973]
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(2) no clinical or EEG response to noise or a pinch; and
(8) repetition of the above twenty-four or forty-eight hours later.
These determinations were not to be made under condi-
tions of hypothermia or anesthetic levels.29
It is important to note that this definition specifies neither the length of
time spontaneous breathing must cease nor the length of time the flat EEG
must be observed. Also, the tests are to be repeated 24 to 48 hours later be-
fore pronouncing the brain dead.
The World Medicial Association drafted the following set of criteria
for determining brain death at its meeting in Sydney, Australia, in 1968:
(1) Total lack of response to external stimuli, even the most pain-
ful that can be ethically applied;
(2) Absence of all spontaneous muscular movements, notably
breathing. If the patient is on a mechanical respirator, this
may be turned off for three minutes in order to establish that
he is capable of breathing himself;
(8) Absence of reflexes. The dilated pupils must not contract
when a bright light is shone directly into them. There must be
no eye movements in response to pouring ice water into the
ears, no muscular contraction of the biceps, triceps, or quad-
riceps;
(4) Flat encephalogram or absence of brain waves.3 0
This proposal does not require a time limit for the existence of the flat
EEG reading, nor does it require a repeat of the tests at any time after
the initial examination in order to document brain death.
The criteria of irreversible coma drafted by the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death
contains the following elements:
A. Unreceptivity and Unresponsitivity
There is total unawareness to externally applied stimuli and
inner need and complete unresponsiveness .... Even the most
intensely painful stimuli evoke no vocal or other response ....
B. No Movements or Breathing
Observations covering a period of at least one hour by phy-
sicians is adequate to satisfy the criteria of no spontaneous
muscular movements or spontaneous respiration or response to
stimuli such as pain, touch, sound, or light. After the patient
is on a mechanical respirator, the total absence of spontaneous
breathing may be established by turning off the respirator for
three minutes and observing whether there is any effort on the
part of the subject to breathe spontaneously.
C. No Reflexes
Irreversible coma with abolition of central nervous system
activity is evidenced in part by the absence of elicitable re-
flexes.
D. Flat Electroencephalogram
Of great confirmatory value is the flat or isoelectric EEG ....
At least ten full minutes of recording are desirable, but twice
that would be better.
29. Corday, supra note 22, at 629.
30. Comment, supra note 16, at 119-20.
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All of the above tests shall be repeated at least twenty-four
hours later with no change. 31
The Harvard irreversible coma criteria seems to have received the
most widespread support from the medical community. This proposal ap-
pears to be more specific in all its aspects than the prior definitions. This
set of criteria specifies only a 10- to 20-minute flat EEG reading, and re-
quires that the tests be performed again at least 24 hours after the first
series of examinations before irreversible coma can be effectively diagnosed.
The greatest difference among these four criteria concerns the interval
required between the initial series of tests and the reexamination of the
patient to determine if the symptoms are still present.32 Other than the
World Medical Association proposal, which requires no repetition of the
tests after the initial series, the time factor ranges from 2 to 24 hours.33
Advocates of the Pittsburgh Committee's criteria argue that waiting longer
than 2 hours is not justified and may hamper transplant efforts.3 4 On
the other hand, supporters of the Harvard criteria contend that reducing
the period below 24 hours would not allow enough observation time to
insure that the person has truly lapsed into irreversible coma.35
A dispute also exists among the proponents of the above proposals,
and in the medical community as a whole, concerning the effectiveness
of the electroencephalogram in diagnosing lack of brain activity. The dis-
agreement centers on how much weight should be given the flat EEG
reading in diagnosing irreversible coma, and how long it must persist to
indicate effectively absence of brain activity. Research conducted by en-
cephalographers since the formulation of the various brain death criteria
may be helpful in settling the dispute. Dr. Henry Beecher has examined
3,000 cases in which the EEG reading was isoelectric for 24 hours or more
without a single recovery.3 6 Such empirical evidence supports the inclusion
of EEG readings as part of any brain death definition, but the dispute still
rages over the time period a flat EEG reading must persist to indicate a non-
functioning brain. Suggested time periods include ten minutes, 37 thirty
31. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 5 U. SAN FAN. L.
Rxv. 283 (1971).
This committee consisted of the following members: Henry K. Beecher, M.D.,
Chairman; Raymond D. Adams, M.D.; A. Clifford Barger, M.D.; Williams J. Cur-
ran LLM., Sm. Hyg.; Derek Denny-Brown, M.D.; Dana L. Farnsworth, M.D.; Jordi
Folch-Pi, M.D.; Everett I. Mendelsohn, Ph.D.; John P. Merrill, M.D.; Ralph Potter,
Th.D., Robert Schwab, M.D.; and William Sweet, M.D.
32. Determination of Death, LANcEr 1092 (1970).
33. One commentator has suggested that waiting even as short as 2 hours
will hamper transplant efforts. See Shapiro, Criteria for Determining that Death
has Occurred, 16 J. For. MFD. 1 (1969).
34. Wecht, Attorney Describes Current Efforts to Establish Uniform Guide-
lines, 43 Hosi,. 54 (1969).
35. Beecher, After the "Definition of Irreversible Coma". 281 Naw ENG. J.
Man. 1070 (1969).
36. Id. at 1071.
37. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, supra note 31, at 283.
1973]
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minutes,3 8 and one hour.39 A majority of experts do agree, however, that
an isoelectric EEG reading alone is an insufficient basis for ascertaining
brain death.40 It is also generally agreed that for the EEG reading to con-
stitute effective evidence of absence of brain activity, there must be no
central nervous system depressant drugs in the patient's system, nor can the
patient be experiencing hypothermia.4 1 Certain factors have been proposed
in addition to those outlined in the above four sets of criteria. Dr. Shalit of
Israel suggests that the measure of oxygen consumption of the brain should
be included as a factor in determining brain death.4 2 Physicians at Johns
Hopkins University agree, and consider oxygen consumption below 10
percent of normal to be an essential criterion in any definition of brain
death.43 These physicians argue that extremely low oxygen consumption by
the brain indicates lack of intracranial circulation, without which the brain
cannot function. In addition, physicians and medical societies in Belgium, 44
Great Britain, 45 Austria,4 6 Germany,47 and France48 have developed cri-
teria for determining brain death, all of which differ in some respects
from the four proposals discussed in this section.
It is apparent from this analysis that, although there exists a consen-
sus in the medical profession favoring the adoption of a definition of death
based on the nonfunctioning brain, a deep division remains as to what
specific criteria should be adopted to define brain death. As long as this
diversity of opinion exists within the medical profession, it is unlikely the
law will alter its present definition of death in favor of brain death.
IV. LEGAL ASPECrS OF THE DEFINITION OF DEATH
A. The Present Legal Definition of Death
The present legal definition of death is based on the classical medical
definitions developed when little was known about the functioning of
the brain. Consequently, the definition is structured in terms of cessation of
heartbeat and respiration. Black's Law Dictionary defines death as
[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians
as the total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessa-
tion of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as
respiration, pulsation, etc. 49
38. See Wecht & Aranson, supra note 26, at 493.
39. See Comment, supra note 25, at 99.
40. See Moore, supra note 23, at 384; Silverman, Saunders, Schwab & Mas-
land, Cerebral Death and the Electroencephalogram, 209 A.M.A.J. 1505 (1969);
Comment, supra note 16, at 120.
41. Hypothermia is "[a]bnormally low temperature of the body." Scmi=nDv's
ATToRNEY's DICTIONARY OF MEDIcIE 441 (1st ed. 1972).
42. Wecht & Aranson, supra note 26, at 491.
43. Walker, The Death of a Brain, 124 JOHNs HOPKINS MED. J. 190 (1969).
44. Halley & Harvey, supra note 7, at 232.
45. Id.
46. Transplant Rounds, 10 MED. WoRLD NEws 340 (Sept. 26, 1969).
47. International Comments, Recommendation by the German Society of
Surgery, 203 A.M.A.J. 998 (1968).
48. Comment, supra note 16, at 120.
49. BLAC's LAW DICTIONARY 488 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
[Vol. 38
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Courts have naturally relied upon this definition in determining the oc-
currence of death. In several cases the courts directly cited the above
definition in support of their decisions.5 0 In numerous other cases, ap-
pellate courts have upheld lower court determinations that an individual
was dead based on cessation of heartbeat and respiration, although they
did not specifically cite the accepted legal definition.51 In these cases, if
there was any evidence referring to the possible existence of heartbeat, cir-
culation, or respiration, the courts ruled that the individual was still alive.
For example, in Taylor v. Cawood,52 Prudential Insurance Co. of America
v. Spain,55 and In re Davenport's Estate,54 all survivorship cases, the courts
based their decisions on witnesses' observations of the victims gasping
for air or making a gurgling sound. In holding that there was sufficient
evidence to find that the victims were still alive when seen by the witnesses,
the courts were obviously of the opinion that respiration was still present.
In Evans v. Halterman55 the court held that there was adequate evidence to
find that the victim of an auto accident was still alive based on a witness's
statement that he detected what he thought was a slight heartbeat in the
individual. The court in Sauers v. Stolz56 accepted a witness's testimony
that blood was spurting from the victim's body as evidence sufficient to
establish the presence of a heartbeat.
B. Rejection of Cessation of Brain Activity as a
Criterion for Determining Death
Several cases have not only supported the cessation of heartbeat and
respiration criteria, but have also rejected cessation of brain activity as an
additional criterion of death. In Vaegemast v. Hess,5 7 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court accepted a coroner's testimony that the victim's heart was
constricted and empty of blood as sufficient to establish she was alive after
her husband's death and refused to recognize evidence of the victim's de-
stroyed cerebrum as determinative of death. Although that portion of the
brain responsible for the reasoning and thinking processes of the victim
was completely destroyed, the court refused even to consider this as evi-
dence of death.58 The strongest rejection of brain death came in Gray v.
50. See Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 622, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958); In re Estate
of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968); Thomas v. Anderson,
96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo.
En Banc 1961).
51. See, e.g., United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 199 Kan. 1, 427 P.2d 67 (1967); Glover
v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 227 (rex. 1963); Telefilm v. Superior Ct., 194 P.2d 542 (Cal.
App. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 201 P.2d 811 (Cal. 1949); Finch v. Edwards, 239
Mo. App. 788, 198 S.W.2d 665 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946) ; Sanger v. Butler, 45 Tex. Civ.
App. 527, 101 S.W. 459 (1907); Stead v. Department of Labor &c Indus., 188 Wash.
171, 61 P.2d 1307 (1936); cases cited notes 52-56 infra.
52. 211 S.W. 47 (Mo. 1919).
53. 339 IlM. App. 476, 90 N.E.2d 256 (1950).
54. 79 Idaho 548, 323 P.2d 611 (1958).
55. 31 Ohio App. 175, 165 N.E. 869 (1928).
56. 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950).
57. 203 Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938).
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Sawyer.59 Although the victim was decapitated, the court nevertheless up-
held a lower court finding that relied on a witness's testimony that blood
was spurting from the victim's body as evidence that she was alive.60 The
court stated that "It]he doctors told the court that a body is not dead so
long as there is a heartbeat and that may be evidenced by the gushing of
blood in spurts. This is so though the brain may have quit functioning."01
In Smith v. Smith 62 the attorney for the appellant specifically argued
that the victim of an auto accident was dead at the instant her brain ceased
to function, although she was maintained on a respirator for 17 days there-
after. This case is significant in light of the present controversy in the area
of transplantation, because it involved the use of artificial life-sustaining
devices to keep the patient "alive." The court flatly rejected the brain
death argument and held that a patient is alive unless his heartbeat and
respiration have ceased. The court asserted that
it would be too much of a strain on credulity for us to believe any
evidence offered to the effect that Mrs. Smith was dead, scientifi-
cally or otherwise, unless the conditions set out in the [Black's Dic-
tionary] definition existed.63
Six years later, in Douglas v. Southerwestern Life Insurance Co.,64 another
case involving artificial means to keep the patient "alive" after his brain
had ceased to function, the court also rejected an argument based on
brain death. The significance of the Smith and Douglas cases lies in the
courts' steadfast adherence to the legal definition of death, and their re-
fusal to include cessation of brain function in that definition even though
the patients' circulation and respiration were being maintained wholly by
artificial means. The courts ignored the fact that the individuals would
never regain consciousness.
Thus, with the exceptions of Tucker's Administrator v. Lower0 and
two state statutes that include brain death as part of the definition of
death, 60 the law refuses to consider absence of brain activity in determin-
ing death. This prevailing attitude results from the fact that the legal
definition of death was taken from accepted medical definitions. 07 The
present medical definitions are based on cessation of heartbeat and respira-
tion. Thus, until the medical profession settles on a basic criteria for de-
termining brain death and alters its own definition of death, the courts
59. 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. App. 1952).
60. Id. at 497; accord, Gugel's Adm'r v. Orth's Ex'r, 314 Ky. 591, 236 S.W.2d
460 (Ky. App. 1950).
61. 247 S.W.2d at 497.
62. 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
63. Id. at 582, 317 S.W.2d at 279.
64. 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
65. No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972); text accom-
panying notes 1 & 2 supra.
66. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F
(Cum. Supp. 1972).
67. Collins, Limits of Medical Responsibility in Prolonging Life, 206 A.M.A.J.
589 (1968); Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis
and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 357, 409 (1968).
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can hardly be expected to make a significant change. 68 Members of the
medical profession who are urging the adoption of a definition of death
based on irreversible coma recognize this dilemma. Two proponents of a
brain death definition, M. Martin Harvey69 and William F. Halley, 0
have stated:
The failure of authoritative medical writings to formulate precise
and scientific definitions of death appear as the direct cause of
similar defects in corresponding legal definitions, which have been
taken from medical material. 71
C. Possible Consequences of a Transplant Surgeon's Applying
Brain Death Criteria
Despite the inability of the medical profession to settle on a single set
of criteria for determining brain death, many surgeons are applying a
brain death definition in their transplant operations.72 This situation can
create many attendant legal problems for transplant surgeons. Possible
civil and even criminal liability await these physicians.
1. Possible Criminal Liability of Transplant
Surgeon for Homicide
No physician has ever been convicted of a criminal violation result-
ing from the removal of a vital organ. Nevertheless, in view of the prevail-
ing legal definition of death, the transplant surgeon who removes a beat-
ing heart from a donor with irreversible loss of brain function incurs the
risk of a possible charge of homicide. The difficulties faced by the doctor
making a decision that the donor is dead on a brain death criteria are
illustrated by the following statement made by John Miner, Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney of Los Angeles, in May of 1968:
[A]s the law now stands, it theoretically would be murder if a doc-
tor took a vital organ from a body not dead by all three criteria
(cessation of heartbeat, respiration and brain function). Any in-
tentional shortening of life is illegal no matter how good the
motive or how inevitable the death of the donor.78
Moreover, the fact that no doctor has been held criminally liable is no
68. See Castel, Some Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation in
Canada, 46 CAN. B. RIv. 345, 352 (1968); Grad, Legislative Responses to the
New Biology: Limits and Possibilities, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 480 (1968); Stickel,
Medicolegal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation, 169 ANN-UAL N.Y.
AcAD. Sci. 362 (1970); Castel, Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation, 78
AM-. HEART J. 130 (1969); Note, Human Organ Transplantation: Some Medico-
Legal Pitfalls for Transplant Surgeons, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 134, 144 (1970).
69. Mr. Harvey is an Associate Professor of Law at Indiana University, In-
dianapolis Law School.
70. Dr. Halley is a Diplomate, American Board of Surgery; Fellow, American
College of Surgeons; Residence and Private Practice of Surgery, Topeka, Kansas.
71. HARvEY & HALLEY, On an Interdisciplinary Solution to the Legal-Medical
Definitional Dilemma in Death, 2 IND. LEGAL F. 219, 224 (1969).
72. Cooley, Minutes of the Capetown Meeting, 9 MED. WoRLD NENWs 21 (Aug.
9, 1968); Note, supra note 68, at 149.
73. 114 CONG. REc. 12785 (1968).
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guarantee that a court will not find a surgeon liable by using the present
legal definition of death.74
2. Possible Avoidance of Liability by the Person
Who Initially Injures the Donor
In addition to potential criminal liability of surgeons for the removal
of a vital organ, transplant operations can possibly have a bearing on homi-
ide cases brought against one who initially injured a donor. If the court
rejects a brain death definition, it can be argued that the donor's death
was caused by the physician who turned off the respirator, rather than by
the defendant who injured the donor in the first place. This question
arose from a transplant operation performed in Houston in 1968. A sur-
geon removed the heart of a severely beaten donor who had suffered ex-
tensive brain damage. The physician based his decision that the donor was
dead on the cessation of the donor's brain function. After the donor was
pronounced dead, the viability of his heart was maintained through the
use of a cardiac machine until it was removed by the surgeon. The county
coroner, however, chose to certify the victim's death on the basis of the
cessation of heartbeat. Thus, it would be possible for the assailant's at-
torney to argue that the victim's death was caused by the surgeon. The dis-
trict attorney was faced with determining whether the defendant could be
tried for homicide, when under the present legal definition of death the vic-
tim died under the transplant surgeon's knife.75 An English jury faced a
similar predicament in the unreported case of In re Potter.7 6 In that case,
an assault victim was maintained on a respirator until pronounced dead
based on the absence of brain activity. The donor's kidney was then removed
in a transplant operation. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of
manslaughter and refused to find that the transplant operation had con-
tributed to the victim's death. Despite this finding, the case illustrates the
possible effect of a vital organ transplant on a homicide case. Whether an
American court and jury will follow this lead is still an open question.
3. Possible Civil Liability of Transplant Surgeon
in Wrongful Death Actions
The threat of civil liability faced by the transplant surgeon may be
even greater than possible criminal liability.77 Removal of a beating heart
from a patient with irreversible coma raises the possibility of a wrongful
death action against the transplant surgeon. Although the jury found in
74. For a discussion of the possible criminal liability faced by the transplant
surgeon, see Castel, supra note 68, at 351; Harvey & Halley, Medical v. Legal
Definitions of Death, 204 A.M.A.J. 423 (1968); Louisell, The Procurement of Or-
gans for Transplantation, 64 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 607 (1970); Perper, Ethical, Religious,
and Legal Considerations to Transplantation of Human Organs, 15 J. FOR. So. 1(1970); Randall & Randall, The Developing Field of Human Transplantation, 5
GONZAGA L. REv. 20 (1969); 114 CONG. REC. 8926 (1968).
75. For a discussion of the Houston case, see Ford, Human Organ Transplan-
tation: Legal Aspects, 15 C-rir. LAw. 136, 141 (1969); 114 CONG. REc. 14522 (1968).
76. 31 M.Dmco-LEGAr. J. 195 (1963).
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favor of the doctor in the Tucker case, other plaintiffs may be successful
in future wrongful death cases. If the courts refuse to allow the jury to con-
sider brain death and require them to use the present legal definition of
death, their decision will have to be for the plaintiff. Even more disturbing
to the transplant surgeon is a survey reported in the American Medical
Association Journal in 1968 indicating that the public in general does not
associate cessation of brain function with death. The results of this survey
were outlined as follows:
The public thinks of death in terms of cessation of cardiopul-
monary functions. Two-thirds of individuals surveyed thought that
death occurred when the heart stopped or breathing had ceased or
both. Only nine percent thought of death in terms of irreversible
loss of cerebral function.78
The people interviewed in this survey are representative of those who will
make up the juries hearing civil cases in this area. Thus, even if a court
takes the Tucker approach and allows the jury to consider absence of brain
activity as one criterion for determining the time of death, the survey indi-
cates that a jury is still likely to reject this criterion. This probability would
be eliminated only if the court accepted the brain death definition as the
sole criterion for determining death.
V. CONCLUSION
The medical profession is reevaluating its traditional view that death
occurs when the heart stops and respiration ceases. In the age of vital or-
gans transplantations and artificial techniques to support cardiac and res-
piratory functions, a new concept of brain death is emerging within the
medical profession.
It is dear, however, that the courts generally reject irreversible coma
as a basis for pronouncing a patient dead. Yet many transplant surgeons
use such a definition. The dangers involved in this situation for the doctors
include possible civil or criminal liability. Moreover, the possibility exists
that a person who initially injures a transplant donor will escape liability
for his death if the transplant surgeon uses a brain death definition of
death.
Two major questions remain unanswered at this time: When will
medicine settle on a single criteria for brain death, and will the law fol-
low this change if and when it comes? The information available indicates
that the medical profession favors a change to brain death, but lack of
unanimity on a standard may cause serious problems. As mentioned earlier,
Kansas and Maryland have passed legislation implementing a brain death
definition. Both statutes include cessation of brain function accompanied
by lack of spontaneous respiration and heartbeat as part of the definition
of death. However, both laws naturally refer to "the ordinary standards of
medical practice" to determine when these conditions exist. Therefore, al-
though these jurisdictions are willing to recognize brain death, they still look
78. Arnold, Zimmerman & Martin, Public Attitudes and the Diagnosis of
Death, 206 A.M.A.J. 1949 (1968).
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